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FAMILY LAW
All happy families resemble one another; every unhappy
family is unhappy in its own fashion.-LEv NIKoLAEvICH TOL-
STOI, Anna Karenina, Part I, ch. I.
MATRIMONIAL LAW IN ILLINOIS IN THE '50's
IRVING S. FRIEDMAN AND MEYER WEINBERGTHE DECADE OF the 'fifties (1950-1960) ushered in the atomic
and space era with its hopes and concomitant anxieties. That
there has been a substantial effect on matrimonial law seems
apparent. Yet a careful analysis of the changes and clarifications in
the law, shows no consistent pattern or trend, except the constant
valiant efforts by the Bench, Bar and Legislature to deal with the
high divorce rate. The focal point of this activity did not, however,
lead either to retrogression or to marked progress. As problems due
to changing social "mores" have arisen, specific attempts have been
made to solve them. Response to scientific procedures, such as blood
tests and psychiatry, is evidenced in new procedures and statutes. It
is to be noted that the statutes and case law are at best in "patchwork"
form, and we here present a survey of the substantive changes and
developments during the last ten years.
MARRIAGE AND ANNULMENT
Notwithstanding the continuous efforts to seek remedy or antidote
to the social problem of divorce by reform in the Illinois Marriage
Act, the only structural change in the statute was in section 2, which
was amended to read: "No insane person or mentally ill person or
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idiot shall be capable of contracting marriage."' The Probate Act in
1957 was amended to provide that, unless expressly stated to the con-
trary in a will, the marriage of the testator after its execution revoked
it.a This amendment merely clarified the law without making a gen-
uine change.3 However, the same amendment made a substantial
change in the effect of divorce or annulment on a will antedating the
divorce or annulment. This section now provides that divorce or
annulment of the marriage of the testator revokes every beneficial
devise, legacy, or interest given to the testator's former spouse in a
will executed before the entry of the decree of divorce or annulment,
and that the will shall take effect in the same manner as if the former
spouse died before the testator. Prior to the enactment of this part
of the amendment, divorce, and presumably annulment, had no effect
on a will. 4
Annulment remains a creature of chancery.5 The first set of "cool-off
statutes" requiring a waiting period before the filing of a complaint was
applicable to annulment. 6 These acts were declared unconstitutional in
People ex rel. Cbristiansen v. Connell.7 New acts were passed in 1955
to cure the constitutional defects pointed out in the Christiansen case,
but they did not contain any applicability to annulment of marriage.'
Thus, Illinois remains without any major statute, in any respect, on the
subject of annulment.
A case of substantial importance was decided in 1956, however,
which case broke new ground in the field of annulment. In Cardenas
v. Cardenas,' the parties had a child born to them after they had
entered into a marriage which was later annulled. In the legal issues
raised, the primary question was whether a court of equity which
has entered a decree of annulment of a marriage has jurisdiction over
matters relating to the care and custody of a minor child. On the
counterclaim filed by the father, the marriage was annulled, but the
mother did not desire support for the child, nor to have the father
I ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 89, S 2 (1959).
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, 5 197 (1959).
8 Kuhn v. Bartels, 374 111. 231, 29 N.E.2d 84 (1940).
4 Speroni v. Speroni, 406 111. 28, 92 N.E.2d 63 (1950); Gartin v. Gartin, 371 111. 418,
21 N.E.2d 289 (1939).
5 Arndt v. Arndt, 399 Ill. 490, 78 N.E.2d 272 (1948).
6 Ill. Laws 1953, at 284-85. s ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, S 7a (1959).
7 2 Ill.2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262 (1954). 9 12 IMI. App.2d 497, 140 NE.2d 377 (1956).
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given any rights of visitation. Over her objection, the court ordered
the father to pay child support and granted him visitation rights. On
her appeal, the Appellate Court pointed out that courts of equity
assume jurisdiction to grant annulments, and have power to provide
for the care of the children involved.
DIVORCE AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
The jurisdiction of divorce and separate maintenance was extended
by the following important amendments: "Waiting" or "Cool-Off"
Laws;10 Removal of Child from Jurisdiction;" Wage Assignments to
Enforce Support. 2 In relation thereto, must be considered the changes
in the Civil Practice Act and Supreme Court Rules. 13 Specifically,
those of substance are section 16, section 17, and rule 17-1.14
"WAITING" OR "COOL-OFF" LAWS
There were two series of "waiting" or "cool-off" laws passed from
1951 to date. The first series, also applying to annulment, were held
unconstitutional. 15 The current, and second series, excluding annul-
ment, were held constitutional. 6 The "cool-off" procedure, which
has been amended from time to time,' 7 is well delineated in the Di-
vorce Act.' Essentially, these laws were a socio-juridical experiment
to solve the divorce problem by a temporary delay, now sixty days,
of the name-calling complaint or marriage-dissolving decree; the in-
terim time was to be used for reconciliation or conference. The pro-
cedure permitted a "waiver" of the delay for emergency cause, i.e.,
nonsupport, injunction, etc. On paper, these laws, well-intentioned,
showed theoretical promise. In practice, as appeared from a series of
polls of judges and lawyers throughout Illinois by the Illinois State
Bar Association, the laws were ineffectual and a failure. Most of the
10 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, S 7b (1959).
11 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 22.1 (1959).
12 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, §23.1 (1959).
13 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 (1959).
14 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17, 101.17-1 (1959).
15 People ex rel. Christiansen v. Connell, 2 l1.2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262 (1954).
16 People ex rel. Doty v. Connell, 9 I.2d 390, 137 N.E.2d 849 (1956).
17 For a fully detailed discussion see WEINBERG, ILLINOIS DIVORCE, SEPARATE MAINTE-
NANCE & ANNULMENT 5 22 (a) (Supp. 1960).
18 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, j§ 7a-e (1959).
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cases, to a ninety-five per cent degree, had a built-in base for "waiver,"
and these were properly allowed. The "cool-off" laws became a bur-
den and detriment to justice. Adding to these burdens, the Illinois
Appellate Court, First District, in Van Dam v. Van Dam9 decided in
effect that the "waiver" was jurisdictional. This put thousands of
prior decrees with waivers in jeopardy by making them reviewable
at any time, even years hence. Fortunately, the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed the Van Dam case,2° and held the waiver discretionary; at
least this legal quagmire was avoided.
There is a strong movement to repeal the "cool-off" laws outright;
another view advocates repealing them but would add an optional
praecipe procedure. In any event, the "cool-off" laws will hardly
survive the 1961 Legislative Session.
EXPANSION OF JURISDICTION OVER CHILDREN
In Solomon v. Solomon,2 it was held for the first time in Illinois
that the courts have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for the change
of a child's name. In 1957, in the case of Strom v. Strom22 the court
upheld the right of a child of divorced parents to have a college edu-
cation provided by the father. In arriving at this conclusion, the
Appellate Court found that the word "children" in the statute is not
qualified by any word or phrase limiting its application to minor chil-
dren. It pointed out that in the days when the Divorce Act was
passed children went to work long before they reached their major-
ity, but even then, education beyond the high school level for children
of average or better scholarship was the common aspiration of Amer-
ican parents. Today, it is regarded as a necessity. The Appellate Court
of Illinois sustained this position in the case of Maitzen v. Maitzen;23
therefore, it can now be regarded as well established that the court
may order a father to furnish a college education to his children, un-
der proper circumstances.
In 1959, both the Divorce Act and Separate Maintenance Acts were
19 25 IMI. App.2d 72, 165 N.E.2d 720 (1960).
20 Van Dam v. Van Dam, 21 Il1.2d 212, 171 N.E.2d 594 (1961).
215 Ill. App.2d 297, 125 N.E.2d 675 (1955).
2213 11. App.2d 354, 142 N.E.2d 172 (1957).
23 24 111. App.2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1959), petition for leave to appeal denied by
Illinois Supreme Court.
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amended to give courts jurisdiction to allow the removal of children
from Illinois.24 These amendments made provisions for the giving of
bond to guarantee the return of children should the court deem it for
their best interests that they be returned.
EFFECT OF CIVIL PRACTICE ACT AND SUPREME COURT RULES
AND EXTENSION OF JURISDICTION THEREFROM
By the 1956 amendments the Legislature made sweeping revisions
in the Illinois Civil Practice Act and SUPREME COURT RULES. 2 s The
applicability of these to matrimonial law also involved sweeping
changes. Of particular import are expansion of divorce and separate
maintenance jurisdiction by sections 16 and 17, and rule 17-1.
Section 17 of the Civil Practice Act provides in part "that a person
who commits a tortious act within this state thereby submits his per-
son to the jurisdiction of our courts.' 20 In Hanson v. Hanson,27 in
the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, the plaintiff had obtained
a divorce from her husband on the grounds of desertion in Illinois.
Service of summons had been by publication in 1948. In 1957, the
wife sought an "in personam" order against the defendant and secured
personal service of a summons upon him in Wisconsin, where he
resided. She contended that the desertion was a tortious act which
was committed in Illinois, and therefore, the Superior Court had
jurisdiction over the defendant's person. The trial court upheld this
contention. One view of this holding is that it is farfetched and erro-
neous, that section 17 cannot be tortured into this shape, and that
desertion is not a tort.
Section 16 of the Civil Practice Act provides in effect that personal
service, though outside the State of Illinois, if upon a citizen or res-
ident of this state or a person who has submitted to its jurisdiction,
shall have the effect of personal service.28 This was added January 1,
1956, to extend the jurisdiction of Illinois, and is consistent with the
legal debalkanization of the states.29
24 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 14 (1959); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 22.1 (1959).
25 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 (1959).
2 6 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (1959).
27 47 S 18731, Super. Ct., Cook County, Nov. 20, 1947.
28 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 16 (1959).
29 See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
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SCOPE OF REFERENCE TO MASTER IN CHANCERY
Stark v. Stark3° held that questions relative to the custody of chil-
dren could be properly referred to a Master in Chancery. The prac-
tice of making such references had been common before this decision,
but it was salutary to have the authority for the practice thus clearly
sanctioned. This authority to refer matters of custody no doubt exists
despite the provision in the Supreme Court Rules that a reference to
a Master shall be the exception rather than the rule.3 '
GROUNDS OR CAUSES FOR DIVORCE
In general, despite constant efforts, the heretofore established
grounds for divorce show no significant structural change. 2 This is
so despite their anachronistic incongruence with modem times. The
best example of the latter is the absence of statutory provision for
divorce from insane defendants.
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AS CONSTITUTING ADULTERY
A problem which has attracted a great deal of attention is whether
artificial insemination without the consent of the husband constitutes
adultery. There has been no Illinois reviewing court decision on this
subject, but the trial court in Doornbos v. Doornbos so held.83 It is
expected that this subject will receive legislative attention in the near
future.
DESERTION-REFUSAL OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE AS A FACTOR
Notwithstanding the prominence of sex in human and marital rela-
tions, Illinois, unlike most other States, has followed an unpalatable
and contrary view, i.e., that refusal of cohabitation is not desertion. 4
However, in Karman v. Karman,3 the wife sued for divorce based
on desertion. The husband counterclaimed and defended on the wife's
refusal to cohabit, and on her ejecting him from the marital home.
80 7 Ill. App.2d 442, 129 NE.2d 776 (1955).
31 ILL. Sup. CT. R. 14-1; Strom v. Strom, 13 111. App.2d 354, 142 N.E.2d 172 (1957).
For a full discussion of chancery proceedings see Goldberg, Developments in Chancery
Proceedings-1950-1960, 10 DE PAUL L. REV. 413 (1961).
82 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, S 1 (1959).
33 54 S 14981, Super. Ct., Cook County, Sept. 20, 1954.
34 Fritz v. Fritz, 138 Ill. 436, 28 N.E. 1958 (1891).
85 24 Ill. App.2d 123, 164 N.E.2d 521 (1960).
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The husband-appellant testified that the wife refused to cohabit with
him. The parties had lived together only twenty-eight days. The wife
was granted a divorce. The Illinois Appellate Court, First District,
reversed and stated in part:
When she refused to cohabit with her husband in a reasonable manner and
ordered him to leave, Appellee became the deserter, and in order to correct
this desertion it became incumbent upon her to make efforts to resume the
marital relationship. She made no attempt to do so.36
In this regard there must be considered Moyer v. Moyer37 wherein
the wife was granted a decree of separate maintenance on January 3,
1956, and on April 26, 1957, sued for divorce charging that desertion
had occurred on November 30, 1954, when the husband was willing
to return to the wife, but without sexual relations. The court held
that this refusal of the husband of sexual relations constituted deser-
tion by him.
DESERTION-ILLEGAL INJUNCTION BARRING SPOUSE
FROM MARITAL HOME
Baumgartner v. Baumgartner"s involved a case in which the wife
obtained an injunction illegally which barred the husband from en-
tering the marital home. The court held that this action of the wife
constituted desertion on her part, and that the husband was entitled
to a divorce on this ground.
DESERTION-AFTER DECREE OF SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
In Hilliard v. Hilliard,39 the wife was granted a decree of separate
maintenance based on desertion in 1947. The husband made bona fide
attempts to reconcile in 1955, but they were spurned. In 1957, the
husband sued for divorce based on refusal of offer of reconciliation.
A divorce was granted. The court reversed and stated:
In the present case the separate maintenance decree of October 1952, estab-
lished that the wife, as of that date, was living apart from her husband without
her fault. This judicial determination of itself (apart from the finding in the
decree, which we need not consider, that the husband's desertion was willful
and had dated from 1947) gave her grounds for divorce for reason of deser-
tion, if the desertion persisted for a year after the entry of the decree. ...
[Citations omitted.] It continued for more than two years thereafter; it was
36 Id. at 129, 164 N.E.2d at 524.
37 17 Il. App.2d 404,150 N.E.2d 394 (1958).
38 16 M. App.2d 286, 148 N.E.2d 327 (1958).
39 25 Ill. App.2d 468, 167 N.E.2d 451 (1960).
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not until February, 1955, that the husband made his initial overture for the
resumption of the marital relationship. By this time it was too late; the deser-
tion, being for over one year, had ripened into the statutory ground for di-
vorce. At this point the wife, as the aggrieved party, had the right to decide
if she wanted to forgive the wrong she had suffered. Her refusal to accept her
husband's belated offers of reconciliation, even though they were made in
good faith, did not make her the deserter nor cure his desertion. While a de-
serted spouse must keep open the door for the possible return of a penitent
deserter, it is not necessary that this be done forever.40
JURY DEMAND
Section 64 of the Civil Practice Act requires that a party desirous
of a trial by jury must file a demand at the time the action is com-
menced. 41 The defendant must file a demand not later than the filing
of his answer. Prior to this enactment, a jury demand in a divorce
action could be filed at any time as a matter of right.4 2
DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
Discovery procedures, added to our judicial process in compara-
tively recent times, are of ever increasing importance. Names and
addresses of all persons having knowledge of relevant facts may be
secured.4
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION
Illinois Supreme Court rule 17-1 provides that in actions in which
the physical or mental condition of a party or of a person in his
custody is in controversy, the court may order that party to submit
to an examination by a physician suggested by the party requesting
the examination.4 4 This rule can be of inestimable value in its appli-
cation to custody and marital controversies, where very often the
mental status of a party is in question.
BLOOD TESTS TO DETERMINE PATERNITY
The determination of paternity is a common problem in matrimo-
nial law. Blood tests, although capable of excluding a man from pa-
ternity, are not so scientifically accurate as to identify the parent.
40 Id. at 490, 167 N.E.2d at 453.
41 ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 110, § 64 (1959).
42 Compare Fox v. Fox, 9 11l.2d 509, 138 N.E.2d 547 (1956), zitb Caplow v. Caplow,
255 III. App. 389 (1930).
43 ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 17, 19-1.
44 ILL. SuP. CT. R. 17-1.
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The Illinois statutes provide for blood tests in civil actions in which
paternity is a relevant fact; the court may order the blood tests.45
Procedure is specific and detailed in these statutes.
POLYGRAPHIC OR "LIE DETECTING" TESTS
TO ESTABLISH PATERNITY
The courts, in seeking to discover the true paternity of a child,
cannot invoke the aid of either truth serums or polygraphic detection
tests. The Legislature has specifically denied them the use of such
methods by the following provision of the Civil Practice Act:
In the course of any civil trial or pre-trial proceeding the court shall not
require that the plaintiff or defendant submit to a polygraphic deception de-
tection test, commonly known as a lie detector test or require, suggest or re-
quest that the plaintiff or defendant submit to questioning under the effect of
sodium pentothal or to any other test or questioning by means of any chemi-
cal substance.46
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT
The physician-patient privilege, added to Illinois law by section 5.1
of the Evidence Act, is a recent development. It should be noted that
it does not, however, affect the operation of the abovementioned
Supreme Court rule by which mental examination of a spouse can
be obtained where mental status is involved, since it provides:
No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he
may have acquired in attending any patron in a professional character, neces-
sary to enable him professionally to serve such patient, except only . . . (2)
in all mental illness inquiries .... 47
USE OF PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
Illinois Supreme Court rule 22 provides in part: "In any civil action,
the court may hold a pretrial conference. ' 4 This furnishes a functional
and salubrious procedure for matrimonial litigation. Pre-trial confer-
ence could be the situs of many reconciliations, if expert attention
were given. In the alternative, related problems of support and prop-
erty rights could be adjusted with much saving in court time. Un-
45 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 106J, §§ 1-5 (1959).
46 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 54.1 (1951). (Emphasis added.)
47 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1959). (Emphasis added.) For a full discussion of the
physician-patent privilege see Cleary, Development in Evidence-1950-1960, 10 DE
PAULL. REV. 422 (1961).
48 ILL. SuP. CT. R. 22.
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fortunately, this rule is practically in disuse. Only a handful of judges
have time or make time for pre-trial conference on an established
basis. In Cook County, Judge Harry G. Hershenson of the Superior
Court has an established afternoon pre-trial schedule of two to five
cases, including set contested motions. Regular motions take up his
morning call. In pre-trial proceedings, plus sensible auxiliary legis-
lation, there is great promise for litigating spouses.
ENFORCEMENT BY WAGE ASSIGNMENTS
The Divorce Act was amended in 1959 to give the court power
to compel a party to execute an assignment of wages to secure the
payment of child support.49
POST-DECRETAL RELIEF UNDER SECTION 72 OF THE CIVIL
PRACTICE ACT, AND PROPERTY AGREEMENTS
Section 72 of the amended Civil Practice Act abolished bills of
review and bills in the nature of bills of review, and provided that
all relief previously obtainable by these and similar actions can be
granted on a petition filed more than thirty days after the entry of
an erroneous order or decree.50 To obtain such relief, the error must
be apparent from an examination of the record.51 This section of the
Civil Practice Act received attention in the important case of James
v. James.52 There a petition was filed under section 50 (6) of the
Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff sought to vacate a decree of divorce
which embodied the settlement of property rights. She alleged that
fraud and duress were practiced on her to obtain her agreement to
an unfair settlement. It was contended that the plaintiff was not with-
in the terms of section 72 of the Civil Practice Act, because her peti-
tion was filed less than thirty days from the time the decree was
entered. The Supreme Court said in that regard:
Were we to hold in this case that the consent feature of the decree precluded
relief by means of a motion filed within 30 days after the entry of the decree,
we would by virtue of Section 72, be telling the plaintiff in effect that she
must wait until the expiration of the 30 days at which time a petition seeking
the same relief in the same cause, would be heard.58
49 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 21.1 (1959). For Separate Maintenance see ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 68, § 23.1 (1959).
60 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 72 (1959).
51 Collins v. Collins, 14 I1l.2d 178, 151 N.E.2d 813 (1958).
52 14 Ill.2d 295, 152 .N.E.2d 582 (1958).
53 Id. at 300, 152 N.E.2d at 584.
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The court held that such delay and incongruity is inconsistent with
the liberal aims of the Civil Practice Act. The James case is also impor-
tant for the reason that it is the first case which set aside a property
settlement in a divorce action in Illinois because it was unfair and in-
equitable.
A recent case in which the point of fairness of a property settlement
was raised is Guyton v. Guyton.54 There, the parties entered into an
oral agreement settling their property rights on the day the case came
up for trial. Plaintiff-wife proceeded to hearing and, in the course of
the hearing, the terms of the agreement were specified and assented to
by the defendant and his attorney. Subsequently, the defendant sought
to prevent the entry of the decree on an unsupported assertion that the
agreement was unfair. The court entered the decree despite this conten-
tion. Thereafter, the defendant filed a petition to vacate the decree,
alleging among other reasons, the fact that the agreement involved the
transfer of real estate, and that not having been in writing, it was in vio-
lation of the Statute of Frauds. The Supreme Court held that where
parties to a divorce proceeding orally contract in respect to alimony and
property rights arising out of the marriage relationship, and the pro-
visions agreed to are incorporated in the decree, the contract becomes
merged in the decree, and the rights of the parties are thereafter based
upon the decree; and where the decree orders the defendant to con-
vey the family home to the plaintiff pursuant to such agreement, the
requirement of the Statute of Frauds that contracts concerning real
estate be in writing has no application.
INTER-STATE ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ORDERS
In 1957, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided the landmark case
of Light v. Light." This case dealt with the modification and en-
forcement of a decree of divorce entered in Missouri. Prior to the
decision in this case, there was some doubt as to the extent of the
power and duty of Illinois courts when confronted by foreign de-
crees. Although the case of Rule v. Rule 6 held that such decrees were
entitled to enforcement in the same manner as local decrees, it seemed
to indicate that the Illinois courts lacked the power to modify such
decrees. Tailby v. Tailby57 subsequently held that an out of state decree
54 17 lll.2d 439, 161 N.E.2d 832 (1959).
55 12 Il1.2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1957).
56 313 11. App. 108, 39 N.E.2d 379 (1942).
57 1111. App.2d 17, 116 N.E.2d 83 (1953).
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was not entitled to enforcement. All doubts were laid to rest by the
forthright holding in the Light case. The Supreme Court decided that
the Missouri decree was entitled to full faith and credit as to future
installments of alimony, and that the Illinois court had the power to
modify that decree.
DIVISIBLE DIVORCE
In 1954, the Supreme Court decided the ease of Pope v. Pope.5"
In this case, the wife had obtained a decree for separate maintenance
in Illinois against her husband, whose counterclaim for divorce in the
same proceedings was dismissed for want of equity. Thereafter, the
husband obtained a decree of divorce in Nevada on constructive
service. The husband did not inform the Nevada court of the prior
litigation in Illinois, and the Nevada court granted him a divorce. This
decree contained no reference to the Illinois decree and did not award
the wife any alimony. After the entry of the Nevada decree, the
plaintiff, in the separate maintenance proceedings in Illinois, filed a
petition to recover past due support payments plus interest. The de-
fendant challenged the plaintiff's right to interest, and her right to
payments which accrued after the entry of his divorce decree. The
trial court sustained the defendant's contentions; on appeal, however,
the Supreme Court reversed and for the first time in Illinois enun-
ciated the doctrine of divisible divorce. The court held that although
the defendant's divorce decree enabled him to contract a new mar-
riage, it did not relieve him of the obligations of the old marriage,
such as the right to alimony accruing before and even after the entry
of the decree. The court pointed out that under the holding in Estin
v. Estin,59 even if the ex parte Nevada decree must be regarded as a
valid determination of the marital status, it cannot be treated as de-
stroying the right to support payments, without the violation of due
process. The court also pointed out that there had been no decision
in Illinois to the effect that a separate maintenance decree is auto-
matically terminated by a decree of divorce entered by a court which
lacks personal jurisdiction over both spouses. In arriving at this con-
clusion, the court considered its prior opinion in Knowlton v. Knowl-
ton,60 which had held that the wife did not have a right to commence
58 2 I11.2d 152,117 N.E.2d 65 (1954).
59 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
60 155 111. 158, 39 N.E. 595 (1895).
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an action for separate maintenance following a foreign divorce ob-
tained by the husband. This decision, the court in the Pope case held,
was not based on Illinois law, but on a supposed requirement of the
full faith and credit clause which may no longer exist.
TAX CONSIDERATIONS
In 1954, the Internal Revenue Code made important changes with
respect to alimony and separate maintenance. Under sections 71 (a)
(2) and 215 of the 1954 Code, payments under a written separation
agreement, even though not incident to a court decree, are taxable
to the receiving spouse and deductible by the paying spouse, pro-
viding the parties are actually separated, and do not file a joint re-
turn.6 ' Under section 71 (a) (3) of this Code, it is thought that pay-
ments of temporary alimony would be income to the recipient spouse
and deductible by the payor"
With reference to deductibility of attorney's fees, attention is
drawn to Bowers v. Commissioner.63 This case allows, in a proper
case, the allocation of attorney's fees to services rendered relative to
a change of status or domestic controversy, and to services performed
with respect to conservation of property. Fees attributable to the
latter are tax deductible, whereas those attributable to the former are
not, even though the same attorney has performed both services.
PERISCOPING THE FUTURE
Regarding the long-range future, attention is drawn to the Joint
Committee on the Codification of Family Law; this committee, com-
posed of members of both the Chicago Bar Association and the Illi-
nois State Bar Association, has been active for more than a year, and
is under the co-chairmanship of Aaron H. Cohn of Chicago and Profes-
sor James M. Forkins of Loyola University College of Law.
On a current, short-range basis, the following legislation has been
submitted to the 1961 Illinois Legislature by the abovementioned Bar
Associations. The acts involve:
A. Reconciliation Statute (Allows courts to enter orders based on
stipulation, permitting litigant spouses to live together without
subsequent defense of condonation.)
61 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, S§ 71(a) (2), 215.
62 TNr. REv. CODE of 1954, § 71 (a) (3).
63 243 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1957).
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B. Temporary Exclusive Possession of Marital Home (Gives
courts in divorce suits (and not in actions for separate main-
tenance) the power to grant temporary exclusive possession of
the marital home to one spouse.)
C. Registration of All Decrees of Marriage, Divorce, Separate
Maintenance, and Annulment.
D. "Waiting" or "Cool-Off" Law (As noted, these laws remain
controversial; legislation will be for outright repeal or for
repeal with retention of optional praecipe and no need for
waiver to file complaint.)
Of course, over the years, problems will arise from social changes
and need which will invite further remedial legislation. It is to be
hoped that the lag between need and action will be shortened some-
what by the growing interest of society in the complexities of the
marriage relationship.
